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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the short-term contagion and long-term 
integration effects of terrorist activity on national stock markets. Using 
the partially-integrated model of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), we 
examine whether changes in cross-border relationships surrounding 
recent terrorist events are caused by changes in exposure to common 
risk factors and investigate whether these findings are similar across 
both developed and emerging market securities. Our research 
concludes that terrorism induces substantial contagion and market 
integration effects on national equity markets. Specifically, we provide 
strong evidence that major terrorist attacks induce substantial 
contagion consequences, particularly for developed nation equity 
markets. In terms of longer-term integration effects, a strong increase 
in cross-market correlation is observed from the pre to post-9/11 
period. However, we find little evidence of an increase in the risk 
exposures of national markets to common risk factors, suggesting that 
this heightened correlation is driven by an increase in global risk factor 
uncertainty. This finding is consistent with the argument that an 
increase in the risk-aversion of market participants is associated with 
terrorist attacks.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), the impact of terrorist events on 
financial markets has become heightened. However, the mechanism by which these events 
propagate across markets is not widely understood. Prior research on markets affected by 
terrorist activity has documented increased financial market volatility and abnormally low 
returns in the period immediately following attacks. Interestingly, so-called 'contagion' 
effects have been documented in markets not directly impacted by the terrorist attack, 
whereby return and volatility impacts are observed (Chen and Seims, 2005). However, 
despite the influence and media focus on terrorist activity, research in this area has been 
relatively limited. Further, existing research has predominantly focused on the short-term, or 
contagion impacts, and typically limits its analysis to measuring the impact of the 9/11 event 
on industrial capital markets.  
 
Consequently, this study expands research in this area in three ways. First, we adopt the risk-
based methodology of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), which is explicitly set within a 
partially-integrated asset pricing framework. This methodology permits an analysis of the 
effects of terrorism on both short-term and long-term equity market linkages, and perhaps 
most importantly on the risk-profiles of the affected markets. This approach is in contrast to 
much of the previous literature in the area which focuses on the traditional event study 
methodology (for example Ramiah et al., 2010 and Chesney et al, 2011). Second, we expand 
the focus of the previous research beyond 9/11 to consider the impact of other major recent 
terrorist attacks. Finally, the study examines both developed and emerging markets to 
distinguish between the implications for markets with varying degrees of integration. This 
final contribution permits us to investigate potential asymmetry in capital flows around 
terrorist events between countries with varying capital market development.  
 
To achieve these objectives, we derive a contemporaneous event sample of recent major 
terrorist attacks and examine the related effects on a comprehensive national equity market 
sample of 45 markets; comprising 21 developed and 24 emerging nation equity markets. 
Overall, our research concludes that terrorism induces substantial contagion and market 
integration effects on national equity markets. Specifically, the strongest contagion effects 
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are observed for developed markets surrounding the 9/11 event. In terms of longer-term 
integration effects, a strong increase in cross-market correlation is observed from the pre to 
post-9/11 period. However, we find little evidence of an increase in the risk exposures of 
national markets to global or regional risk factors, suggesting that this heightened correlation 
is driven by an increase in global risk premia. This finding is consistent with previous 
research suggesting that terrorist activity may result in an increase in the risk-aversion of 
market participants.  
 
The remainder of the paper initially proceeds by providing a review of the relevant literature 
in Section Two. Section Three details the methodology, while Section Four outlines the 
sample. Section Five reports the primary results of the investigation. Finally, Section Six 
draws conclusions from the analysis. 
 
II. PRIOR STUDIES 
As with other system shocks, it is expected that financial markets within the country targeted 
by the terrorist attack will be affected to some degree. By definition, such attacks are 
unexpected and hence market prices should react to the information as news. However, 
whether these shocks are transmitted to the financial markets of other countries is less 
obvious (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). Under the assumption of capital market integration and 
equality in relation to real rates of return, investors will trade securities internationally such 
that the expected return on similar risk securities should be equalised (Adler and Dumas, 
1983). Even under mild assumptions of integration (such as those proposed by Errunza and 
Losq, 1985), cross-border market linkages arise due to macroeconomic similarities (Karolyi 
and Stulz, 1996; Bracker, Doching and Koch, 1999; and, Hernandez and Valdez, 2001); trade 
linkages (Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; Dornbusch, Park and 
Claessens, 2000); and/or, financial linkages (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 and Phylaktis and 
Ravazzolo, 2002). Further, even where economic linkages are weak between nations, 
informational asymmetries between market participants can result in portfolio rebalancing of 
global portfolios and subsequent cross-hedging of national idiosyncratic risks (Kodres and 
Pritsker, 2002 and Karolyi, 2003). It is these direct macroeconomic linkages, and/or indirect 
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informational asymmetries, that drive the longer-term integration of national capital markets, 
and that provide a mechanism for transitory contagion to occur (Ferreira and Laux, 2008).  
 
In general, „contagion‟ refers to the short-term propagation of financial market shocks from 
one country to another and can be observed via co-movements in security price changes 
(Karolyi, 2003; and, Moser, 2003). However, the extant literature provides numerous 
definitions and measures of financial market contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). For 
example, King and Wadwhani (1990) propose increased correlation between markets 
following a major shock occurs as a result of market participants inferring information from 
price changes in other countries. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that a shock resulting in a 
distinct increase in the extent of cross-market linkage over and above that previously existing 
represents the effect of contagion. Similarly, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) define 
contagion not only as an increase in cross-market correlation, but more specifically as an 
increase in excess of that expected based on economic fundamentals.  
 
While limited empirical evidence investigating the contagion impacts of terrorism currently 
exists (see, for example Hon, Strauss and Yong, 2004; and, Mun, 2005), a substantial body of 
literature documents significant contagion effects following financial crises (see, for 
example, King and Wadwhani, 1990; and, Calvo and Reinhart, 1996), and catastrophic 
events (see, for example, Fields and Janjigian, 1989; and, Kalra, Henderson and Raines, 
1993). These effects have been associated with capital flight towards safety assets (Johnston 
and Nedelescu, 2005). For this reason, unexpected increases in uncertainty following major 
terrorist attacks should result in abnormal returns on a broad scale (see, for example, Drakos, 
2004; Glaser and Weber, 2005; and, Fernandez, 2006). Indeed, the extant literature 
documents evidence of substantial returns, volatility and contagion effects on financial 
markets as a result of acts of terrorism. Carter and Simkins (2002) report negative abnormal 
returns across the US airline industry stocks following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Furthermore, 
Drakos (2004) finds significant increases in systematic and idiosyncratic risk associated with 
airline equity markets in the post-9/11 environment. Chen and Siems (2004) investigate the 
US equity market response to terrorist attacks between 1915 and 2001, consistently finding a 
negative market response in each instance of terrorism. Moreover, Chen and Siems (2004) 
 5 
conduct a detailed examination of the response of 29 national equity markets to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and find strong evidence of significant global negative abnormal returns. 
While Glaser and Weber (2005) confirm that market participants perceive the post-9/11 
environment to be comparatively more risky than prior to the event. Finally, following the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, Mun (2005) documents evidence of significant volatility contagion 
from the USA to the United Kingdom and Germany; and significant return contagion from 
the USA to Japan.  
 
III. CONTAGION MODELS 
King and Wadhwani (1990); and Solnik, Boucrelle and Le Fur (1996) advocate the use of 
simple return correlation to measure cross-border return linkages. Specifically, for any 
market pair, the raw cross-market correlation (i,j) over a particular event window [t,T] can 
be defined as:  
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where, 
i,jt,T = the covariance between national equity market i and national 
equity market j during the event window [t,T], 
ijt,T = the standard deviation of national equity market i during the event 
window [t,T] and 
 jt,T = the standard deviation of national equity market j during the event 
window [t,T]. 
 
While seemingly crude, the advantage of the correlation metric is that it is free of 
assumptions regarding the factor structure of international returns. As such it avoids the 
much publicised difficulty in defining systematic risk in the international context (Bekaert 
and Harvey, 1995; and Heston, Rouwenhorst and Wessels, 2005) and as a consequence 
avoids the issue of omitted variable bias.
1
 However, the correlation measure has been shown 
                                                 
1
 Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) discuss this issue in the context of asset pricing models, while 
Rigabon (2003) shows how omitted variables can impact on measures of cross-market linkages. 
 6 
to be influenced by changes in market volatility. Specifically, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
show that increased market volatility may result in a spurious increase in association, despite 
no change in the underlying linkage between the market returns.  
 
With the above limitation in mind, we also estimate cross-market linkages using the factor 
model of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005). This model (hereafter referred to as the BHN-
model) assumes that markets are integrated either internationally or regionally, and is 
expressed as;  
 
  , ,,, 0 , , i i reg i treg tt i w w tR R R            ...(2) 
Where: 
 Ri,t = The return on national equity market i at time t; 
 Rwld,t = The return on the world market index at time t; 
Rreg,t = The return on regional equity market index, at time t; 
i,t = The residual term for country i at time t. 
 
The first factor in the BHN model (Rwld,t) is the world market factor from the International 
CAPM of Solnik (1976) and Adler and Dumas (1983). Under the assumption of global 
market integration, expected returns should be a linear function of the excess return on the 
world market. Harvey (1991) finds evidence to support the pricing of this factor for a set of 
21 developed markets, but found that this conclusion fails to hold for an emerging market 
sample (Harvey, 1995). The second factor (Rreg,t) is a regional factor, calculated as the equity 
market return on a portfolio of geographically proximate nations. This factor has its origins 
in the convergence literature of economics (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988), whereby production 
factors (in particular labour) are assumed to be more highly mobile within a region than 
without. Under this assumption, factor costs and income growth are equalised on a regional 
basis, with the resultant economic integration being a precursor to greater regional financial 
integration (Phylaktis and Ravazzolo, 2002). In support of such a regional effect, Bekaert, 
Harvey and Ng (2005) find consistently strong exposure to such a regional factor. Similarly, 
Cheung, He and Ng (1997) find regional similarities in the factors predicting excess stock 
returns on national market indices.  
 7 
 
While the evidence primarily supports a significant degree of market integration, 
contradictory evidence is also present, therefore indicating that findings are mixed. The 
current state of extant market integration literature tends to suggest markets experience a 
degree of integration that is partially characteristic of the integration continuum extremities 
of full segmentation and full integration (Choi and Rajan, 1997). Further, these integration 
levels have been shown to demonstrate significant time variation (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; 
Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005). Notwithstanding these issues, the two factor BHN model is 
not susceptible to the volatility induced bias of the correlation measure. Further, it permits us 
to identify the source of any change in market linkages. Specifically, any change in the 
global or regional integration levels of the markets would be observed through the i,wld or 
i,reg coefficients, respectively, or through the idiosyncratic (ie. market specific) term (i,t) 
being more highly correlated across markets.
2
  
 
IV. SAMPLE 
To examine the contagion and integration effects of terrorism, we construct a sample of 
'significant' terrorist attacks, from the Terrorist Research Centre‟s Terrorist Attacks Database. 
The US Department of State defines a „significant‟ terrorist attack as terrorist attacks that 
kill, or seriously injure, at least 10 individuals and cause more than $10,000 in damage.
3
  The 
final sample is obtained by adding the additional filter according to the following criteria. 
First, we focus on the most recent attacks, which have occurred over the 1996-2006 period. 
Second, we restrict our sample to consider prominent terrorist attacks. Specifically the 
attacks must be against a developed market, cause significant damage and receive a high 
level of media coverage.
4
 Based on this filtering process we obtain a final sample of six 
major terrorist attacks during the period 1998 to 2005. The attacks that comprise the final 
sample include:- US Embassy bombings in East Africa (7th August, 1998); USS Cole attack 
in Yemen (12th October, 2000); September 11 attacks in the USA (11th September, 2001); 
                                                 
2
 This issue is discussed in length in Section V.  
3
 This information is available on the US Department of State‟s website (http://www.state.gov/).  
4
 These requirements increase the likelihood of consequences from the terrorist attacks. Further, we require each 
event to be the subject of global media coverage generating greater than 500 related press articles in the three 
months following the initial attack, which is identified through Factiva. We search titles and lead paragraphs of 
all press channels for key words identifying each terrorist attack using Factiva. 
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Bali bombings in Indonesia (12th October, 2002); Madrid bombings in Spain (11th March, 
2004); and the London Bombings in the UK (7th July, 2005).  
 
*********************************************** 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS 
*********************************************** 
 
Initially, we report key information associated with each terrorist attack comprising our final 
event sample in Table I. Inspection of Table I identifies the most severe consequences of all 
event sample attacks are attributable to 9/11. Further, the least recent terrorist attack we 
investigate is the US Embassy bombings on 07-Aug-1998; while the most recent attack we 
examine is the London bombings on 07-Jul-2005.  
 
We investigate the contagion and market integration impact of terrorism at the national level. 
To accomplish this, we collect daily return data for 45 national equity markets, comprising 
21 developed nations and 24 emerging nations.
5
 Consistent with the extant literature, we 
utilise the MSCI World Equity Market Index as our proxy for world equity market returns 
(see, Bekaert and Harvey, 1995). All returns are continuously compounded, include 
dividends and capitalisation adjustments and are converted to a common numeraire (in this 
case the US dollar) using prevailing daily spot rates. Regional indices are constructed for 
each country by value-weighting the index returns of geographically neighbouring countries, 
excluding the return for that particular country.  
 
*********************************************** 
TABLE 1I – PANEL A ABOUT HERE 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DEVELOPED MARKET SAMPLE 
*********************************************** 
 
*********************************************** 
                                                 
5
 This sample is consistent with other studies of national indices (eg. Harvey, 1991 and 1995).  
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TABLE 1I – PANEL B ABOUT HERE 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EMERGING MARKET SAMPLE 
*********************************************** 
 
Panels A and B of Table II detail market capitalisation characteristics pertaining to the 45 
national equity markets. In aggregate, the national equity market sample represents a total 
market capitalisation of US$22,527,082 million. The US equity market accounts for the 
largest proportion of the total sample market capitalisation (49.55%) and is followed by 
Japan (11.02%) and the UK (9.21%). Furthermore, the total developed nation equity market 
capitalisation embodies 95% of the total sample capitalisation with the remaining emerging 
market nations attributable to only 5% of the total. Of the emerging nation markets Taiwan, 
Korea and Brazil are the largest national emerging equity markets in our sample, representing 
16.22%, 14.38% and 12.62% of the total emerging market sample‟s market capitalisation. 
 
Analysis of the Jarque-Bera statistics reveals evidence that all daily return series are 
significantly non-normally distributed. This observation is consistent with existing literature 
that finds daily return series are generally characterised as exhibiting skewness and excess 
kurtosis. Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, we find no evidence of non-stationarity in 
the return series for any of the countries in our sample.  
 
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
As a precursor to the formal tests, we examine cross-market correlations around the major 
terrorist events. This enables us to obtain an overview of the market reactions surrounding 
terrorist events. To accomplish this, we calculate 12-month rolling correlations of each 
market's returns with the world market index return. Using an equally-weighted approach, we 
aggregate these country correlations for each of (1) the developed markets sample; (2) the 
emerging markets sample and (3) the combined developed and emerging markets sample.
6
 
These correlations are depicted in Figure I. Consistent with the current literature (see, for 
example, Bekaert, 1995) we observe a persistently higher level of world market integration 
for the developed nation equity markets in comparison to the emerging nation equity 
                                                 
6
 Value-weighted analysis is conducted at a later stage of the paper.  
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markets. Furthermore, the figure is generally suggestive of the notion that cross-market 
correlations rise following terrorist activity.  
 
*********************************************** 
FIGURE I ABOUT HERE 
CORRELATIONS AROUND ATTACKS 
*********************************************** 
 
Table III presents a more precise statistical inspection of the contagion impacts of terrorist 
attacks. We define contagion as raw cross-market correlations, as advocated by King and 
Wadwhani (1990). To accomplish this, we initially compare the cross-market correlations 
between national equity markets before the terrorist attacks with their respective correlations 
after the attack. Following Chen and Siems (2002) we use a one-month estimation window to 
calculate the cross-market correlations.
7
 To address potential heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation bias emphasised by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), standard errors are 
calculated using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error method 
prescribed by Newey and West (1987).
8
  These results are reported in Panel A of Table III. 
 
The second method used to examine contagion is through the analysis of the residuals from 
the BHN model, as in equation (2). These results are reported in Panel B of Table III. 
 
*********************************************** 
TABLE III 
CONTAGION EFFECTS 
*********************************************** 
 
To understand the figures in Table III, recognise that the table reports the average of the 
changes in raw correlations (Panel A) and factor model residuals (Panel B) for each of the six 
                                                 
7
 Using the event study approach of Brown and Warner (1985), Chen and Siems (2002) show that a one-month 
window is sufficiently large to capture the majority of the price movement associated with the terrorist attacks 
in their sample. The analysis was recalculated using both 5-day and 3-month windows without altering our 
conclusions.  
8
 This regression approach is formally presented in the following equation: ij,t = 0 + 1 Attackt + ij,t.  
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terrorist attacks in our sample. Columns (4), (5) and (6) report the value-weighted average of 
the changes for the group of the 45 markets in the sample, the 24 developed markets and 21 
emerging markets, respectively. Consistent with prior literature, we conduct our analysis 
using value-weightings as we are interested in the impact of terrorist attacks on an 
international investor's portfolio, rather than on the local equity markets per se. Interestingly, 
the average results show general consistency between the Panel A and B results, indicating 
that the findings are robust when we control for changes in economic fundamentals 
surrounding the event date (Bekaert, Harvey and Ng, 2005).  
 
Consistent with Hon, Strauss and Yong (2004) and Mun (2005), we find significant evidence 
of increases in raw cross-market correlations following these attacks. However, closer 
inspection reveals that this result is driven by the developed market sample, and the average 
impact on cross-correlations in the emerging market sample is actually negative. The 
asymmetric effect is perhaps supportive of the conclusions of Johnstone and Nedelescu, 
2005, who argue that such events may result in a flight of capital into safety assets, and away 
from such assets as emerging market equities.
9
 However, one exception to these general 
findings is the contagion associated with the 9/11 attacks. In contrast with most of the other 
events, the 9/11 event was associated with strong positive increases in raw correlations for 
both developed and emerging markets in the sample. This conclusion is consistent with 
findings of contagion effects following 9/11 by Hon, Strauss and Yong (2004) and Mun 
(2005). Furthermore, our findings are also consistent with the broader catastrophic events 
extant literature that demonstrate substantial evidence of global contagion effects (see, for 
example, Fields and Janjigian, 1989; and, Kalra, Henderson and Raines, 1993). Such a 
mechanism could result in more permanent impacts on cross-border linkages, and thereby 
influence the integration level of national equity markets. As such, we now turn our attention 
to the longer-term integration impacts of the 9/11 event.  
 
Table IV presents the more permanent effects of terrorism on cross-market correlation than 
the contagion analysis. Consequently, it provides an insight into the international integration 
                                                 
9
 There is extensive literature indicating that emerging market assets are considered risky to international 
investors, and are associated with heightened volatility, political risk susceptibility and large exchange rate 
fluctuations (eg. Bekaert and Harvey, 2000).  
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effects of the terrorism phenomenon. Panel A reports the average aggregated cross-market 
return correlation changes for selected medium to long-term event windows. Most notably, 
we observe significant positive cross-market correlation increases in the 3 and 5-year periods 
in the post-9/11 environment. While this result is evident overall, it appears to be entirely 
attributable to changes identified in the developed nation market sample, since none of the 
changes in return correlations in the emerging market sample are significant. This conclusion 
is largely consistent with the extant literature that indicates substantial fundamental changes 
in equity market linkages in the post-9/11 environment (see, for example, Glaser and Weber, 
2005).  
 
*********************************************** 
TABLE IV  
INTEGRATION EFFECTS 
*********************************************** 
 
Even though the observed increase in raw correlations observed in Panel A of Table IV looks 
compelling, the increased correlation is not necessarily associated with greater exposure to 
global systematic risk factors (Lessard (1973) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998)). As explained 
by Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), the increased correlation between markets could be due 
to either increased exposure to common risk factors or to an increase in the volatility of the 
risk factors themselves.
10
 For example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show how changes in the 
level of volatility have significant impact on the accuracy of raw correlation. Given that our 
integration tests necessarily involve long estimation windows, the assumption of constant 
volatility is likely to be violated. Due to these difficulties, we focus instead on the risk 
exposures.
11
  
 
The investigation of risk exposures in an international context is the central premise of the 
capital market integration literature. Specifically, heightened cross-market correlations could 
                                                 
10
 As discussed earlier, these common factors could be either global or regional in nature.  
11
 There is extensive literature on volatility modelling, ranging from autoregressive models (such as the 
GARCH and ARCH models) to the stochastic volatility representations. These models tend to be less reliable in 
periods of market turbulence, due to jumps in volatility (Chiang, Jeon and Li, 2007).  
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be driven by the strengthening of common information linkages at either the global or 
regional level. Similarly, this would be consistent with a reduction in the importance of local-
market (ie. idiosyncratic) information (Henry, 2000). Panel B of Table IV reports the change 
in average exposures for the full, developed and emerging market samples to each of the 
global regional factors, as well as the idiosyncratic correlations.
12
 From the table, we find 
little evidence to support an increase in correlation. Whilst the change in global betas before 
and after 9/11 is positive, it is statistically insignificant and the reduction in idiosyncratic risk 
correlation is only significant for the emerging market sample. This finding is supportive of 
the conclusions of Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst (2005) who find little evidence of 
increased capital market integration over the past 20 years. The one significant result for the 
developed markets sample is the negative change in regional beta. However, as this result is 
negative, it is actually supportive of a decrease in cross-market correlation. In light of no 
evidence supporting an increase in the risk exposures of the markets in our sample, we 
conclude that it is greater volatility in the global and regional risk factors that is driving the 
heightened correlations after 9/11. Such an increase in volatility is consistent with the 
arguments of Glaser and Weber (2005) that the 9/11 attacks resulted in increased expected 
returns due to an increase in investor risk aversion.  
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the risk-based methodology of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005) is employed to 
investigate both short-term and long-term effects of terrorist activity. Second, we expand the 
focus of the previous research beyond 9/11 to consider the impact of other major recent 
terrorist attacks. Finally, our methodology allows us to distinguish between the implications 
for both developed and emerging nation markets. To achieve these objectives, we derive a 
contemporaneous event sample of recent major terrorist attacks directed towards developed 
nations and examine the related effects on a comprehensive national equity market sample of 
45 markets; comprising 21 developed and 24 emerging nation equity markets.  
                                                 
12
 These exposures are estimated using the model of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), via 
Rt=0+i,wRw,t+i,regRi,reg+i,t.. This model is estimated using a 5-year window before 9/11 and 5-years after 
9/11. The table reports the change in coefficients and correlation across these two samples. To address potential 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation bias emphasised by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), standard errors are 
calculated using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error method prescribed by 
Newey and West (1987), and are calculated using Chow's breakpoint test (Chow (1960).  
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Overall, our research concludes that terrorism induces substantial contagion and market 
integration effects on national equity markets. Specifically, that major terrorist attacks induce 
substantial contagion consequences, particularly for developed nation equity markets. In 
particular, we identify that on average terrorist activity results in short-term contagion, even 
after controlling for economic fundamentals. Importantly, we identify asymmetry between 
developed and market samples, with emerging market linkages reducing significantly in 
response to these events. In terms of longer-term integration effects, a strong increase in 
cross-market correlation is observed from the pre to post-9/11 period. However, we find little 
evidence of an increase in the risk exposures of national markets to global risk factors, 
suggesting that this heightened correlation is driven by an increase in the volatility of global 
risk factors. This finding is consistent with previous authors that have suggested an increase 
in the risk-aversion of market participants associated with terrorist attacks.  
 
 15 
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adler, M. and B. Dumas, 1983, "International Portfolio Choice and Corporation Finance: A 
Synthesis", Journal of Finance, v38(3), pp925-984.  
Bekaert, G., 1995, “Market Integration and Investment Barriers in Emerging Equity 
Markets”, World Bank Economic Review, v9, pp75-107. 
Bekaert, G. and C. Harvey, 1995, “Time-Varying World Market Integration”, Journal of 
Finance, v50(2), pp. 403-444. 
Bekaert, G. and C. Harvey, 2000, “Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets”, 
Journal of Finance, v55, pp565-613. 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey and A. Ng, 2005, “Market Integration and Contagion”, Journal of 
Business, v78(1), pp. 39-69. 
Bracker, K., D, Docking and P. Koch, "Economic Determinants of Evolution in International 
Stock Market Integration", Journal of Empirical Finance, v6, pp1-27.  
Brennan, M., T. Chordia and A. Subrahmanyam, 1998, "Alternative Factor Specifications, 
Security Characteristics, and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns", Journal of 
Financial Economics, v49, pp345-373.  
Brown, S. and J. Warner, 1985, "Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 
Journal of Financial Economics, v14, pp3-31.  
Calvo, S. and C. Reinhart, 1996, “Capital Flows to Latin America: Is the Evidence of 
Contagion Effect?”, in Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets After the Mexican 
Crisis, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 
Carter, D. and B. Simkins, 2002, “Do Markets React Rationally? The Effect of the 
September 11th Tragedy on Airline Stock Returns”, Working Paper, Oklahoma State 
University.  
Chen, A, and T. Siems, 2004, “The Effects of Terrorism on Global Capital Markets”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, v20, pp. 349-366. 
Chesney, M., G. Reshetar and M. Karaman, 2011, “The impact of terrorism on financial 
markets: An empirical study”, Journal of Banking and Finance, v35(11), pp253-267.  
Cheung, Y-W., J. He and L. Ng, 1997, "Common Predictable Components in Regional Stock 
Markets", Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, v15(1), pp35-42.  
 16 
Chiang, T., B. Joen, and H. Li, 2007, "Dynamic Correlation Analysis of Financial Contagion: 
Evidence from Asian Markets", Journal of International Money and Finance, v26, 
pp1206-1228.  
Choi, J. and M. Rajan, 1997, “A Joint Test of Market Segmentation and Exchange Risk 
Factor in International Capital Markets”, Journal of International Business Studies, 
v28(1), pp29-49. 
Chow, G., 1960, “Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions”, Econometrica, v28, pp591-605. 
Dornbusch, R., Y. Park and S. Claessens, 2000, “Contagion: Understanding How It Spreads”, 
World Bank Research Observer, v15(2), pp. 177-197. 
Drakos, K., 2004, “Terrorism-Induced Structural Shifts in Financial Risk: Airline Stocks in 
the Aftermath of the September 11th Terror Attacks”, European Journal of Political 
Economy, v20, pp435-446. 
Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyplosz, 1996, “Contagious Currency Crises: First Tests”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, v98(4), pp463-484. 
Errunza, V. and E. Losq, 1985, "International Asset Pricing under Mild Segmentation: A 
Test", Journal of Finance, v40(1), pp105-124.  
Fernandez, V., 2006, “The Impact of Major Global Events on Volatility Shifts: Evidence 
from the Asian Crisis and 9/11”, Economic Systems, v30, pp79-97. 
Ferreira, M. and P. Laux, 2008, "Portfolio flows, Volatility and Growth", Journal of 
International Money and Finance, v28(2), pp271-292.  
Fields, A. and V. Janjigian, 1989, “The Effect of Chernobyl on Electric-Utility Stock Prices”, 
Journal of Business Research, v18, pp81-88. 
Forbes, K. and R. Rigobon, 2002, “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock 
Market Co-movements”, Journal of Finance, v57(5), pp. 2223-2261. 
Glaser, M. and M. Weber, 2005, “September 11 and Stock Return Expectations of Individual 
Investors”, Review of Finance, v9, pp243 – 279. 
Glick, R. and A. Rose, 1999, “Contagion and Trade: Why are Currency Crises Regional?”, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, v18(4), pp. 603-617. 
Goetzmann, W., L. Li and G. Rouwenhorst, 2005, "Long-Term Global Market Correlations", 
Journal of Business, v78(1), pp1-38.  
 17 
Griffin, J. and A. Karolyi, 1998, "Another look at the role of the Industrial Structure of 
markets for International Diversification Strategies", Journal of Financial Economics, 
v50, pp351-373.  
Harvey, C., 1991, "The World Price of Covariance Risk", Journal of Finance, v46, pp111-
157. 
Harvey, C., 1995, "Predictable Risk and Return in Emerging Equity Markets", Review of 
Financial Studies, v8, p773-816.  
Henry, P., 2000, "Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform and Emerging Market 
Equity Prices", Journal of Finance, v55(2), pp529-564. 
Hernandez, L. and R. Valdez,2001, “What Drives Contagion: Trade, Neighbourhood or 
Financial Links”, International Review of Financial Analysis, v10, pp. 203-218. 
Heston, S. G. Rouwenhorst and R. Wessels, 1995, "The Structure of International Stock 
Returns and the Integration of Capital Markets", Journal of Empirical Finance, v2, 
pp173-197.  
Hon, M., J. Strauss and S. Yong, 2004, “Contagion in Financial Markets after September 11: 
Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Financial Research, v27(1), pp. 95-114.  
Jarque, C. and A. Bera, 1980, "Efficient Tests for Normality, Homoscedasticity and Serial 
Independence of Regression Residuals, Economics Letters, v6, pp255-259.  
Johnston, R. and O. Nedelescu, 2005, “The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets”, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/05/60. 
Kalra, R., G. Henderson, and G. Raines, 1993, “Effects of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident 
on Utility Share Prices”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, v32, pp. 52-
78. 
Karolyi, A., 2003, "Does International Financial Contagion Really Exist?", International 
Finance, v6(2), pp179-199.  
Karolyi, A. and R. Stulz, 1996, "Why do stock markets move together? An Investigation of 
US-Japan Stock Return Commovement", Journal of Finance, v51, pp951-986.  
King, M. and S. Wadwhani, 1990, “Transmission of Volatility between Stock Markets”, 
Review of Financial Studies, v3, pp. 5-33. 
Kodres, L., and M. Pritsker, 2002, "A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Contagion", 
Journal of Finance, v57(2), pp769-799.  
 18 
Lessard, D., 1973, “International Portfolio Diversification: A Multivariate Analysis for a 
Group of Latin American Countries”, Journal of Finance, v28(3), pp619-633. 
Lucas, R., 1988, "On the Mechanics of Economic Development", Journal of Monetary 
Economics, v22, pp3-42.  
Moser, T., 2003, “What Is International Financial Contagion?”, International Finance, v6(2), 
pp. 157-178.  
Mun, C., 2005, “Contagion and Impulse Response of International Stock Markets around the 
9-11 Terrorist Attacks”, Global Finance Journal, v16(1), pp. 48-68. 
Newey, W. and K. West, 1987, “A Simple, Positive Semi-definite, Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix”, Econometrica, v55(3), pp703-708. 
Phylaktis, K. and F. Ravazzolo, 2002, "Measuring Financial and Economic Integration with 
Equity Prices in Emerging Markets", Journal of International Money and Finance, 
v21, pp879-903.  
Ramiah, V., M-A Cam, M. Calabro, D. Maher and S. Ghafouri, 2010, “Changes in equity 
returns and volatility across different Australian industries following the recent 
terrorist attacks”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, v18, pp64-76.  
Rigobon, R., 2003, "On the Measurement of the International Propogation of Shocks: Is the 
Transmission Stable?", Journal of International Economics, v61, pp261-283.  
Romer, P., 1986, "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth", Journal of Political Economy, 
v94(5), pp1002-1037. 
Solnik, B., C. Boucrelle and Y. Le Fur, 1996, "International Market Correlation and 
Volatility", Financial Analysts Journal, v10, pp17-34.  
 
 
 19 
TABLE I: MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACK EVENTS 
Table I presents key information pertaining to each terrorist attack comprising our final event sample. For each 
terrorist attack we identify the date, location, the developed nation of intent that the attack is directed towards; 
the number of deaths resulting from the attack; and, the number of injuries resulting from the attack. This 
information is available on the US Department of State‟s website: http://www.state.gov/issuesandpress.  
 
Terrorist Attack Date Location Nation of Intent Deaths Injuries 
US Embassy bombings 7
th
 August, 1998 East Africa USA 301 5,096 
USS Cole attack 12
th
 October, 2000 Yemen USA 17 39 
September 11 attacks 11
th
 September, 2001 USA USA 3,025 >5000 
Bali bombings 12th October, 2002 Indonesia Australia 202 400 
Madrid bombings 11th March, 2004 Spain Spain 191 >2000 
London bombings 7th July, 2005 UK UK 56 770 
Total    3,792 >13.300 
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TABLE II – PANEL A: DEVELOPED MARKET SAMPLE 
Table II, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the 21 developed markets daily return series over the 1st January 1996 to the 31st December 2006 period. 
Columns (2), (3) and (4) contain for each market the mean market capitalisation (MV) in millions of US dollars, the mean capitalisation relative to the developed 
market sample (%DSM) and the full sample of 45 countries (%FS). Columns (5) through (8) contain descriptive statistics for the returns. MEAN is the average 
return over the sample, SD is the standard deviation, SKEW and KURT are the excess skewness and kurtosis, respectively. The final two columns contain test 
staistics for the normality test (JB) of Jarque and Bera (1980) and the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test as per Dickey and Fuller (1979). Under the joint null 
of zero skewness and kurtosis, the JB statistic is distributed as a 22. The ADF test has finite-sample critical values against the null of non-stationarity as per 
MacKinnon (1991). * (**) denotes significance at the 5% (1%) level.  
 
Market MV %DSM %FS Mean SD SKEW KURT JB ADF 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Australia 336,157 1.57% 1.49% 0.0004 0.0110 -0.0771 5.5100 755.7020** -53.8274** 
Austria 22,704 0.11% 0.10% 0.0005 0.0109 -0.3817 5.4615 793.7290** -50.4304** 
Belgium 128,263 0.60% 0.57% 0.0004 0.0119 0.2350 7.7936 2772.3830** -47.3547** 
Canada 537,518 2.51% 2.39% 0.0005 0.0120 -0.4340 7.6161 2636.3770** -51.2977** 
Denmark 82,779 0.39% 0.37% 0.0006 0.0120 -0.2175 5.1225 560.9529** -55.1395** 
Finland 120,109 0.56% 0.53% 0.0009 0.0232 -0.1592 9.1314 4504.8580** -52.7725** 
France 1,022,096 4.77% 4.54% 0.0005 0.0128 -0.0892 5.2487 608.0963** -52.1440** 
Germany 745,078 3.48% 3.31% 0.0004 0.0145 -0.0916 5.4071 696.4225** -53.6806** 
Hong Kong 417,954 1.95% 1.86% 0.0003 0.0162 0.4215 15.2790 18102.5000** -29.1266** 
Ireland 70,090 0.33% 0.31% 0.0004 0.0119 -0.3450 6.8810 1856.7650** -49.8998** 
Italy 509,636 2.38% 2.26% 0.0004 0.0127 -0.0559 5.3689 672.0656** -52.5169** 
Japan 2,481,586 11.58% 11.02% 0.0001 0.0143 0.3751 7.4808 2466.5640** -52.7366** 
Netherlands 509,775 2.38% 2.26% 0.0003 0.0132 -0.0725 6.3120 1313.3230** -52.7719** 
New Zealand 18,851 0.09% 0.08% 0.0002 0.0133 -0.2695 10.4096 6595.5990** -53.1949** 
Norway 63,287 0.30% 0.28% 0.0005 0.0136 -0.2442 6.1501 1214.3330** -51.9282** 
Portugal 47,285 0.22% 0.21% 0.0004 0.0109 -0.0958 5.5039 753.5820** -46.9116** 
Spain 323,097 1.51% 1.43% 0.0006 0.0134 0.0103 5.4816 735.9752** -50.9917** 
Sweden 189,861 0.89% 0.84% 0.0006 0.0172 0.1281 6.48.53 1459.4630** -51.7549** 
Switzerland 566,203 2.64% 2.51% 0.0004 0.0121 0.0963 6.1586 1196.6640** -54.4619** 
UK 2,073,950 9.68% 9.21% 0.0002 0.0125 -0.1183 5.1732 571.0439** -52.7361** 
US 11,162,540 52.09% 49.55% 0.0003 0.0110 -0.0137 6.3146 1312.9560** -54.2468** 
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TABLE II – PANEL B: EMERGING MARKET SAMPLE 
Table II, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 24 emerging markets daily return series over the 1st January 1996 to the 31st December 2006 period. 
Columns (2), (3) and (4) contain for each market the mean market capitalisation (MV) in millions of US dollars, the mean capitalisation relative to the emerging 
market sample (%ESM) and the total sample of 45 countries (%FS). Columns (5) through (8) contain descriptive statistics for the returns. MEAN is the average 
return over the sample, SD is the standard deviation, SKEW and KURT are the excess skewness and kurtosis, respectively. The final two columns contain test 
staistics for the normality test (JB) of Jarque and Bera (1980) and the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test as per Dickey and Fuller (1979). Under the joint null 
of zero skewness and kurtosis, the JB statistic is distributed as a 22. The ADF test has finite-sample critical values against the null of non-stationarity as per 
MacKinnon (1991). * (**) denotes significance at the 5% (1%) level.  
 
Market MV %ESM %FS Mean SD SKEW KURT JB ADF 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Argentina 20,817 1.90% 0.09% 0.0005 0.0213 -1.0654 23.0597 48628.1300** -48.3662** 
Brazil 138,553 12.62% 0.62% 0.0007 0.0215 -0.0933 8.5462 3679.9890** -37.6669** 
Chile 50,329 4.58% 0.22% 0.0003 0.0103 -0.1162 6.3958 1384.4610** -42.2125** 
China 17,217 1.57% 0.08% 0.0007 0.0147 -0.1510 8.6202 3785.4760** -51.9052** 
Colombia 3,631 0.33% 0.02% 0.0005 0.0141 0.1939 20.6095 37074.30** -41.2569** 
Czech Republic 2,147 0.20% 0.01% 0.0006 0.0142 -0.1633 5.2637 625.0901** -47.8593** 
Egypt 4,416 0.40% 0.02% 0.0006 0.0145 0.0662 9.3584 4833.3640** -33.6798** 
Hungary 5,850 0.53% 0.03% 0.0010 0.0191 -0.3684 10.1416 6159.6160** -49.1994** 
India 83,490 7.60% 0.37% 0.0006 0.0157 -0.2106 7.0397 1971.2970** -49.4042** 
Indonesia 24,958 2.27% 0.11% 0.0004 0.0310 0.0860 23.6918 51167.6200** -24.1085** 
Israel 23,604 2.15% 0.10% 0.0004 0.0153 -0.1597 7.5590 2495.9880** -51.1425** 
Jordan 3,293 0.30% 0.01% 0.0006 0.0112 0.2706 14.7188 16445.8400** -51.7244** 
Korea 157,923 14.38% 0.70% 0.0005 0.0261 0.7871 16.8149 23102.6700** -27.6538** 
Malaysia 90,067 8.20% 0.40% 0.0001 0.0188 1.7320 39.3135 159015.1000** -22.2467** 
Mexico 112,751 10.27% 0.50% 0.0007 0.0163 0.0814 9.8655 5635.8340** -37.3635** 
Morocco 5,474 0.50% 0.02% 0.0004 0.0087 0.2530 7.6142 2574.8310** -44.0104** 
Peru 4,609 0.42% 0.02% 0.0006 0.0119 -0.2454 7.9350 2939.1150** -47.4551** 
Philippines 18,761 1.71% 0.08% 0.0001 0.0181 1.4528 23.6834 52131.1900** -44.5492** 
Russia 30,926 2.82% 0.14% 0.0016 0.0306 -0.0290 11.7219 9090.8930** -48.9293** 
South Africa 90,381 8.23% 0.40% 0.0003 0.0160 -0.4249 7.1000 2095.1190** -50.4662** 
Sri Lanka 401 0.04% 0.00% 0.0004 0.0151 1.9561 70.8599 552122.6000** -36.4904** 
Taiwan 178,185 16.22% 0.79% 0.0002 0.0174 0.0774 5.3719 675.1432** -51.7938** 
Thailand 27,479 2.50% 0.12% -0.0001 0.0232 1.0065 13.0445 12540.8200** -44.9001** 
Venezuela 3,002 0.01% 0.01% 0.0006 0.0258 -0.3126 26.7293 67334.45** -51.4513** 
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TABLE III: CONTAGION EFFECTS 
Table III reports the change in cross-market correlation surrounding each of 6 terrorist events. Two 
contagion measures are used to calculate the return correlations. Panel A uses the raw return contagion 
definition as per King and Wadwani (1991), while Panel B uses the residuals from fitting the Bekaert, 
Harvey and Ng (2005) model. Specifically, the table shows the change in correlations, calculated as the 
correlation in the 1-month following the terrorist event less the correlation 1-month prior to the event. 
Columns (4), (5) and (6) report the value-weighted average correlations aggregated over the total sample of 
45 countries (column 4), the developed markets sample (column 5) and the emerging markets sample 
(Column 6), respectively. The final row of each panel contains the average of these figures across all 6 
events. * (**) denotes significance at the 5% (1%) level. 
 
Contagion 
metric 
Event Date 
Full 
Sample 
Developed 
markets 
Emerging 
markets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PANEL A: Return Correlations 
 US Embassy 7
th
 August, 1998 0.0776** 0.0993** -0.1252** 
 USS Cole 12
th
 October, 2000 0.2228** 0.2388** 0.0732 
 9/11 11
th
 September, 2001 0.1988** 0.2002** 0.1855** 
 Bali 12th October, 2002 0.1817** 0.1957** -0.0877 
 Madrid 11th March, 2004 0.1448* 0.1562* -0.0750 
 London 7th July, 2005 0.0092 0.0199* -0.1779** 
      
 Average  0.1392** 0.1517** -0.0345** 
      
PANEL B: Residual Factor 
 US Embassy 7
th
 August, 1998 0.0776** 0.0993** -0.1252** 
 USS Cole 12
th
 October, 2000 -0.0657 -0.0657 -0.0658 
 9/11 11
th
 September, 2001 0.0090 0.0039 0.0559 
 Bali 12th October, 2002 -0.0046 0.0063 -0.2147* 
 Madrid 11th March, 2004 0.1112** 0.1179* -0.0183 
 London 7th July, 2005 0.0718 0.0882 -0.2182** 
      
 Average  0.0332** 0.0417** -0.0977** 
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TABLE IV: THE INTEGRATION EFFECTS OF 9/11 
Table IV reports the integration effects associated with the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist event. 
Specifically, the table reports changes in various integration metrics calculated across the pre and post 
event window. Panel A shows the raw return correlations as per King and Wadwhani (1990). The 
correlations are calculated using each of a 1, 3 and 5 year symmetrical window pre and post the 9/11 event. 
Panel B reports the change in risk exposures associated with the 9/11 event. Columns (4), (5) and (6) report 
the value-weighted average of each metric aggregated over the total sample of 45 countries (column 3), the 
developed markets sample (column 4) and the emerging markets sample (Column 5), respectively. * (**) 
denotes significance at the 5% (1%) level.  
 
Integration  metric Window Full Sample Developed 
markets 
Emerging 
markets 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PANEL A: Return correlations 
 -1 year, + 1 year 0.0151 0.0183 -0.0154 
 -3 years, + 3 years 0.0937** 0.1043** -0.0046 
 -5 years, + 5 years 0.0786** 0.0868** 0.0021 
     
     
PANEL B: Change in risk exposures 
World Beta -5 years, + 5 years 0.0331 0.0247 0.0114 
Regional Beta -5 years, + 5 years -0.0311** -0.0308** -0.0379 
Residual Risk Correlation -5 years, + 5 years -0.0215 -0.0172 -0.0619* 
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FIGURE I: CORRELATIONS AROUND MAJOR TERRORIST EVENTS 
Figure I presents rolling 12-month correlations of the markets in the sample with the MSCI World Index 
returns over the 1st January 1994 to the 31st December 2006 period. Specifically, the figure illustrates the 
equally-weighted average of the rolling correlations aggregated for each of the 21 developed markets, 24 
emerging markets and the combined 45 markets, respectively.  
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